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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant, Ralph J. Henderson, by and through his attorney of record, Norman G. Reece, 
P.C., hereby submits the following Appellant's Reply Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case was set forth fully in Appellant's initial brief and will not be 
repeated here. Therefore, the nature of the case, course of proceedings, and statement of facts as set 
forth in Appellant's Brief are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in awarding Respondents their attorney fees uuder the Operating 
Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C.? 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As noted in Appellant's Brief, the award of attorney fees in this case is discretionary and 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547,549, 181 P.3d 473,475 
(2008). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN A WARDING 
RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEY FEES. 
Although the court correctly denied Respondents their attorney fees uuder Idaho Code (LC.) 
§ 12-120(3) and§ 12-121, the court erred in awarding attorney fees to the Respondents uuder the 
terms of a certain provision of the Operating Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C. 
("HIP Operating Agreement"). The provision at issue provides as follows: 
In any action or proceeding brought to enforce any provision of this 
Agreement, or where any provision is validly asserted as a defense, 
the successful party is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees 
in addition to any other available remedy. 
HIP Operating Agreement at 9 ,r XIV(G), R. p. 62. 
Thus, by its plain terms, this provision applies only if (1) the litigation seeks to enforce a 
provision of the HIP Operating Agreement, or (2) a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement is 
validly asserted as a defense thereto. 
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This case was not one where the Appellant sought to enforce any provision of the HIP 
Operating Agreement, nor where the Respondents validly asserted any provision of the HIP 
Operating Agreement as a defense. Therefore, ,i XIV(G) of the HIP Operating Agreement for 
attorney fees does not apply, and the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees under that 
provision. 
A. The Judicial Dissolution Action Was Not Brought 
to Enforce Any Provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. 
Respondents argue that, since the HIP Operating Agreement was "relevant" to this case, the 
attorney fee provision found in ,i XIV(G) applies. Respondents' Brief, dated December 10, 2008 
("Respondents' Brief') at 4-5. 
Respondents' argument misses the point. Obviously, it is impossible to bring an action for 
judicial dissolution under LC.§ 53-643 without a limited liability company governed by an operating 
agreement. In this case, but for the parties' business relationship as defined by the HIP Operating 
Agreement, Ralph would not have had grounds for the judicial dissolution. Moreover, the mere fact 
that the HIP Operating Agreement gave rise to the lawsuit does not mean the lawsuit was designed 
to enforce a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. Several recent cases from the Idaho 
Supreme Court support this position. 
In Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007), the parties had signed a stock 
purchase agreement, and plaintiff subsequently filed suit, alleging various tort and contract theories 
ofliability stemming from that transaction. Mannas, 143 Idaho at 930, 155 P.3d at 1169. The stock 
purchase agreement contained a provision for an attorney fee award to the prevailing party if a 
lawsuit were brought to enforce the terms of the stock purchase agreement. Mannas, 143 Idaho at 
937, 155 P.3d at 1176. The Supreme Court held that attorney fees were not available under that 
provision of the stock purchase agreement, because neither party sought to enforce the stock 
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purchase agreement. Mannas, 143 Idaho at 937, 155 P.3d at 1176. 
In Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 122, 192 P.3d 1036 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court 
considered an attorney fee provision similar to the one at issue in this case. In Chavez, a property 
settlement agreement stemming from a divorce between the parties contained a provision for an 
award of attorney fees if either party instituted litigation seeking to enforce the property settlement 
agreement. Chavez, 146 Idaho at 216, 192 P .3d at I 040. The Chavez case was a quiet title action, 
and the Idaho Supreme Court held that although the action was based on the property settlement 
agreement, it did not seek to enforce the property settlement agreement, and thus denied attorney 
fees based on the attorney fee provision of the property settlement agreement. Chavez, 146 Idaho 
at 225, 192 P.3d at 1049. 
In Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 166 P.3d 374 (2007), the 
court likewise denied attorney fees requested under the terms of an agreement between the parties. 
In Lane, the Lane Ranch Partnership entered into an annexation agreement with the City of Sun 
Valley. Lane RanchPartnership, 144 Idaho at 586-87, 166 P.3dat376-77. After Sun Valley denied 
the partnership's zoning applications, the partnership sued Sun Valley. Lane Ranch Partnership, 
144 Idaho at 587, 166 P.3d at 377. At issue was the effect of the terms of the annexation agreement 
on the zoning applications. Lane Ranch Partnership, 144 Idaho at 589-90, I 66 P.3d at 379-80. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that, since the partnership was not seeking specific enforcement of the 
annexation agreement, attorney fees were not available under a provision of the agreement which 
allowed for attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action brought under the agreement. Lane 
Ranch Partnership, 144 Idaho at 591-92, 166 P.3d at 381-82. 
Finally, Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 170 P.3d 393 (2007), similarly denied a request for 
attorney fees based on a contract provision, since the terms of the provision did not apply to the 
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context of the lawsuit. The lawsuit in Cannon arose out of a contract containing a provision for an 
award of attorney fees against the defaulting party if the lawsuit was brought to enforce the contract. 
Cannon, 144 Idaho at 730, 732, 170 P.3d at 395,397. The Idaho Supreme Court held the attorney 
fee provision did not apply because neither party had been adjudicated to be in default. Cannon, 144 
Idaho at 732, 170 P.3d.at 397. 
Thus, as illustrated by the Mannos, Chavez, Lane Ranch, and Cannon cases, the mere 
existence of an agreement with an attorney fee provision does automatically entitle the prevailing 
party to an award of attorney fees. The precise terms of the attorney fee provision must be met. 
Moreover, in each of these cases, the fact that such an agreement gave rise to the litigation did not 
automatically invoke application of the provision for an attorney fee award; indeed, the request was 
denied because the precise terms of the provision did not apply to the case at issue. Thus, where the 
case was not one for enforcement of a contract term, a provision for attorney fees in enforcement 
actions was held not to apply. 
Likewise, in this case, while Ralph's lawsuits may have had their genesis in the HIP 
Operating Agreement, that fact alone does not mean the attorney fee provision of,i XIV(G) applies. 
Respondents have failed to show that this litigation sought to enforce any provision of the HIP 
Operating Agreement. Therefore, the court erred in awarding attorney fees under ,i XIV(G). 
The trial court abused its discretion in holding that Ralph was seeking to enforce several 
provisions of the HIP Operating Agreement by bringing the action for judicial dissolution. First, 
since Ralph was seeking judicial dissolution of HIP, the last thing his lawsuit would seek is 
enforcement of any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement, because that would result in 
continuing the existence of HIP, rather than dissolving HIP. Second, the Respondents' argument that 
Ralph tried to enforce ,i XIV(B) of the HIP Operating Agreement is disingenuous as well. The sole 
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relevance of,r XIV(B) of the HIP Operating Agreement was in Ralph's attempt to show irreparable 
harm, an element of judicial dissolution, by that provision. He was not seeking to "enforce" that 
provision. Paragraph XIV(B) of the HIP Operating Agreement provided: 
B. Specific Performance. The parties to this Agreement agree that 
irreparable damage would occur if any of the provisions of this 
Agreement were not performed in accordance with its specific terms 
or were otherwise breached. The parties agree that they are entitled 
to an injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches of this Agreement 
and to specifically enforce the terms and provisions in any United 
States court or any state having jurisdiction, in addition to any other 
remedy to which they are entitled at law or in equity. 
HIP Operating Agreement at 9 ,r XIV(B), R. 62. 
Clearly, if,r XIV(B) were used, for example, in an action for injunctive relief, then Ralph 
would have been seeking to enforce this provision. Indeed, that is the intent of this provision in an 
enforcement context. But as indicated earlier, Ralph's sole purpose in using ,r XIV(B) was to show 
an element of his action for judicial dissolution - irreparable harm. Therefore, the court abused its 
discretion in holding that this, along with other provisions of the HIP Operating Agreement, were 
sought to be enforced by Ralph in bringing his judicial dissolution action. 
B. The Statutory Dissociation Action Was Not Brought 
to Enforce Any Provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. 
The Respondents argue that, since the attorney fee provision allows an attorney fee award 
in the judicial dissolution action, attorney fees should also be awarded in the statutory dissociation 
action, since the two were essentially the same. Respondents' Brief at 8-9. Respondents' argument 
attempts to bootstrap an award of attorney fees based on the dissolution action without showing the 
dissociation action was brought to enforce a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. This is a 
critical distinction, because that is what the plain language of the provision requires - an action to 
enforce a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. 
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Moreover, this distinction is most critical in the dissociation action, because of the plain 
terms of the statute upon which the action was based-LC. § 53-64l(e). Under LC. § 53-64l(e), if 
a proceeding for dissolution is commenced against a member of a limited liability company and has 
not been dismissed within 120 days, the member ceases to be a member, unless otherwise provided 
by the operating agreement. Therefore, by the very terms of the statute, an action brought under LC. 
§ 53-64l(e) cannot be an action to enforce a provision of an operating agreement. Simply put, the 
statute cannot apply if an operating agreement contains a provision to the contrary. Section 53-
641 ( e) comes into play when there is no such provision in the operating agreement. Consequently, 
a lawsuit under§ 53-64l(e) cannot be an action to enforce a term of an operating agreement. Thus, 
there is no way in which Ralph's dissociation action under LC. § 53-64l(e) was brought to enforce 
a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. The fact that the HIP Operating Agreement contained 
nothing similar to the provisions of that statute precludes enforcement of an HIP Operating 
Agreement provision as grounds for such a lawsuit. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion 
in awarding attorney fees as to the dissociation action. 
III. 
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
THEIR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
For the same reasons as explained above, no attorney fees should be awarded to the 
Respondents on appeal. Neither the judicial dissolution nor statutory dissociation action sought to 
enforce any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. Therefore, the attorney fee provision of,r 
XIV(G) does not allow an award of attorney fees to the Respondents on appeal. Chavez, 146 Idaho 
at 225, 192 P.3d at 1049 (denying award of attorney fees on appeal where provision for attorney fee 
award in agreement at issue allowed such an award for breach of agreement, and appeal was from 
dismissal of an action not asserting breach of agreement). 
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furthermore, Respondents are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal, because they failed to 
indicate their claim as an additional issue on appeal under "Issue Presented on Appeal" as required 
by Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the district court in awarding attorney fees to the 
Respondents. The trial court abused its discretion by applying the attorney fee provision of the HIP 
Operating Agreement where it clearly did not apply. The trial court did not exercise reason when 
it ruled the provision applied to the case at bar. Neither case was instituted to enforce any provision 
of the HIP Operating Agreement. This was a necessary and critical condition precedentto any award 
of attorney fees at trial or on appeal. The trial court's decision to award attorney fees was thus in 
error and should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 2009. 
NORMAN G. REECE, P.C. 
By_~-------~-+------
Norman G. Reece, Jr., of the F rm, Attorney 
for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE; 
. I hereby certify that on this 8th day of January, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregomg APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by depositing the same in the United States mail, at 
Pocatello, postage pre-paid, in an envelope addressed to: 
Ron Kerl 
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
---------- --·---.--~---······ ···-··---·-
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